Updating Australia’s Critical Minerals List: issues paper

Professor Melinda Fitzgerald Office of the Deputy Vice-Chancellor, Research
Deputy Vice-Chancellor, Research (Interim)
GPO Box U1987
Perth Western Australia 6845

Telephone +61 8 9266
Email lindy.fitzgerald@curtin.edu.au
Web curtin.edu.au

17 August 2023

Dear Critical Minerals Office

We are once again grateful for the opportunity to provide input into Australia’s Critical Minerals Strategy.
The following is Curtin University’s recommendations regarding updates to the nation’s Critical Minerals
List.

1. Is the current set of criteria still fit for purpose? The Critical Minerals List currently includes
minerals:
• essential to modern technologies, economies and national security
• whose supply chains are vulnerable to disruption
• that our strategic partners need; and
• for which Australia has potential economic geological resources.

Currently the criteria for changes to the Critical Minerals List is only reviewed periodically, and this should
be a more dynamic and agile review process given the following variable conditions:
• Changing global dynamics: The geopolitical and economic landscape changes over time, and
minerals that were once abundant and uncontested might become critical due to new
technological demands, geopolitical tensions, or shifts in production and trade routes.
• Changing landscape of Australia’s defence relationships and strategies: Before AUKUS, Australia
was active in cultivating bilateral security relationships with countries such as Japan, India and
South Korea, consequential powers located in the Indo-Pacific that share concerns about China’s
strategic trajectory. As these nations develop strategies to reduce their dependency on critical
mineral supplies from China and Russia, Australia will be well positioned to benefit from that if
policy settings are proactive and agile to incentivise market facilitation and attract necessary risk
capital.
Much of the public policy debate on AUKUS has focused on Pillar 1 - the design and construction of
nuclear-powered submarines, whereas Pillar 2, targeted at accelerating collaboration on
autonomous systems, sensors and hypersonic, has received far less consideration and will depend
heavily on the secure supply of critical minerals. China eclipses not only AUKUS for processing
those minerals into usable forms, but the rest of the world combined. Without critical minerals,
states are open to economic coercion in various technological industries, and defence
manufacturing is particularly exposed to unnecessary supply-chain challenges.1

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AUKUS and cri,cal minerals: hedging Beijing’s pervasive, clever and coordinated statecra<
By Ben Halton and The Honourable Kim Beazley AC. ASPI 22 June 2023. hKps://www.aspi.org.au/report/aukus-and- cri,cal-minerals-hedging-beijings-pervasive-clever-and-coordinated-statecra<
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• Technological evolution: As new technologies emerge, the demand for certain minerals may
increase. For instance, the rise of electric vehicles and renewable energy solutions has escalated
the demand for minerals like lithium, cobalt, and rare earth elements. The criteria for critical
minerals need to account for rapidly changing technological trends.
• Environmental and social concerns: The extraction of certain minerals can have environmental
and social impacts. As global emphasis on sustainability increases, criteria should evolve to
consider the environmental footprint of mining and processing or the ethical implications of
sourcing, and initiatives such as Guarantee of Origin to track the ethical and sustainable supply
chain should be considered part of the regime.
• Resilience and diversification of supply chains: The COVID-19 pandemic underscored the
vulnerabilities of global supply chains. The future criteria might place a greater emphasis on
diversifying sources of critical minerals to ensure resilience against unexpected shocks.
In 2022, RAND Corporation assessed Beijing’s domination of critical minerals, outlining that:2
• 18 of 37 minerals relevant to defence applications are concentrated in China
• 14 more are concentrated in countries with strong diplomatic and economic ties to China,
including Russia, Brazil, and Belt and Road Initiative countries
• only five defence-related minerals are concentrated in the US, Canada and Australia.
• Recycling and substitution: The ability to recycle minerals or find substitutes can reduce a
mineral's criticality. Advances in recycling technologies and material science will change the
importance of certain minerals over time.

2. For minerals that are currently on the list, or minerals that should be considered for addition to, or
removal from, the list:
a. Which technologies does the mineral feed?
b. What evidence is there of supply chain disruption relating to those minerals?
c. What market, financing, technical or other barriers affect these supply chains?
d. Are the barriers or supply chain disruption risks more acute in certain applications or levels of
mineral grade or purity than others?
Curtin University believes the minerals/elements in the following list should be considered for
inclusion in the Australian list. Most of the minerals in the table appear in the US Critical Minerals list.
The minerals shaded green (rare earth) and blue (platinum group metals) currently appear grouped
as single entries in the Australian Critical Minerals table, but Curtin recommends splitting them into
their component minerals, for better detail on the criticality of each.
In the case of the platinum group metals (platinum, palladium, rhodium, ruthenium, osmium and
iridium), two of these – osmium and iridium – should not appear in the list, as they are not critical
minerals.
Likewise, of the rare earth elements (cerium, dysprosium, neodymium, lanthanum, praseodymium,
samarium and terbium), cerium and lanthanum should not appear in the list, as they are ubiquitous
and have little value.

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Assessing Systemic Strengths and Vulnerabili,es of China's Defense Industrial Base
With a Repeatable Methodology for Other Countries. Cortney Weinbaum, Caolionn O'Connell, Steven W. Popper, et al.
Nov 2022. www.rand.org/t/RRA930-1.
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Mineral/element: Related technologies: Known supply chain Supply chain barriers Affect of grade or
disruption purity
Arsenic semi-conductors
In most cases, In all cases, the
Barite hydrocarbon production. markets are not free. criticality depends
Cesium research and development Australian on downstream
companies’ price constraints in
Copper critical decarbonisation technologies
takers have little refining and
(PV panels, EVs, etc)
room to manoeuvre conversion to
Dysprosium permanent magnets, data storage
and are dependent advanced materials.
devices, and lasers
upon China to
Erbium fibre optics, optical amplifiers, lasers, See discussion
purchase final
and glass colorants below.
products.
Europium phosphors and nuclear control rods
Fluorspar manufacture of aluminium, cement, There is no control
steel, gasoline, and fluorine over pricing and it is
chemicals not a balanced and
Galodinium Magnet production China withholding competitive market.

Holmium permanent magnets, nuclear control See discussion below.
rods, and lasers
Iridium coating of anodes for electrochemical
processes and as a chemical catalyst
Lanthaneum
Lutetium scintillators for medical imaging,
electronics, and some cancer
therapies
Neodymium Magnet production China withholding
Nickel stainless steel, superalloys, and
rechargeable batteries
Palladium coating of anodes for electrochemical
processes and as a chemical catalyst
Platinum coating of anodes for electrochemical
processes and as a chemical catalyst
Praseodymium Magnet production China withholding
Rhodium coating of anodes for electrochemical
processes and as a chemical catalyst
Rubidium research and development in
electronics
Ruthenium coating of anodes for electrochemical
processes and as a chemical catalyst
Samarium Magnet production China withholding
Scandium alloys, ceramics, and fuel cells
Tellurium solar cells, thermoelectric devices,
and as alloying additive
Terbium permanent magnets, fibre optics,
lasers, and solid-state devices
Thulium various metal alloys and in lasers
Tin protective coatings and alloys for
steel
Ytterbium catalysts, scintillometers, lasers, and
metallurgy
Yttrium ceramic, catalysts, lasers, metallurgy,
and phosphors
Zinc galvanised steel

Appears on US list and should be considered for inclusion.
Currently grouped together as platinum group metals
Currently grouped together as rare earth elements
Copper should also be considered, given its importance – see note below.

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3. Should Australia differentiate between criticality or importance of minerals, and the capability to
process them, through categories within the list or a separate category that sits alongside the list?
This differentiation could reflect the size and maturity of markets and the different challenges or
barriers faced.
As criticality is determined by downstream processing, the focus should shift to critical metals and
materials rather than minerals. The markets, even when they may have matured in the past, have
predominantly been captured by singular countries with inadequate ESG and security credentials.
It is worth noting that mineral/metal/materials criticality is seldom at the
resource/mine/concentrator level, but rather at the point of refining and conversion to advanced
materials. For example, we are not resolving criticality constraints by continuing to ship rare earth or
critical mineral concentrates to nations such as China. In reality, this action brings about ongoing
strategic vulnerabilities, as reliance on a single or limited number of processing facilities creates
ongoing dependency and security risks.
Criticality is increased by shipping partially processed materials to nations that have the capability to
process them without ensuring that there is a complete, parallel and government-underwritten
pathway of production that is supported no matter the level of market and price manipulation (as in
most cases, critical minerals are not conventional commodities and don’t have free market controls).
Without access to efficient forms of financing, many critical minerals projects will struggle to reach
maturity. Current risk-equity financing methods require companies to evaluate projects by NPV, IRR
and EBITDA projections based on ‘best guesses’ of prospective offtake agreements and long-term
commodity pricing to raise finance.
The inherent flaw in this approach is that critical minerals are not controlled by conventional supply-
demand equilibrium in a competitive marketplace such as the London Metals Exchange which deals in
standardised forward contracts, futures contracts and options on base metals. Critical mineral pricing
is uncertain and opaque.
The speculative nature of the market tends to make project evaluations unreliable, and investors will
be reticent to invest in companies intending to produce critical minerals. Therefore, provision of
minimum revenue offtakes on a five, ten or 20-year basis gives greater certainty around the revenue
model, removes some of the downside risk from the investment decision and improves customer
understanding in the early stages of market development.
Many critical commodities are produced as by-products and are recovered late in the metallurgical
recovery process. In many cases, grades of these commodities are poorly constrained or unknown,
resulting in highly uncertain resource estimates for Australia and the world.
It is important that we identify what is actually critical. For example, though high purity aluminium
foil/metal and high purity alumina are critical materials, bauxite is not, nor should it be, a critical
mineral. We should incentivise domestic conversion to metallic aluminium and high purity alumina
and aluminium salts (sulphate and nitrate). Only then do we attend to the criticality of the metals,
and not by producing more bauxite which we sell to China (or South Africa, with strong Chinese
influence and member of BRICS).
Antimony: Antimony is a critical mineral, but antimony sulfide (stibnite) concentrate isn’t critical.
Copper: High purity copper metal should be classified as a Critical Material. Copper concentrate is
not. With governments worldwide forcing reductions in carbon emissions, the move towards
electrifying transportation and accelerating efforts towards green energy, demand for copper is
expected to double by 2050 — from 25 million tonnes in 2020 to 50 million tonnes — driven by

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critical decarbonisation technologies, such as wind turbines, photovoltaic panels, heat pumps, electric
vehicles and energy-efficient equipment.3
Gallium and germanium, tungsten, tantalum and tin: The refined metal forms of these are critical
materials.
Graphite: The current critical minerals list cites graphite, but graphite flake concentrate is not a
critical material. Refined, spheroidised graphite is a critical material. Graphite is a key mineral for the
energy transition, contributing to cleantech solutions. The global demand for graphite could grow by
up to 500% by 2050, compared to 2018 levels. The bulk of this demand is driven by two industries:
lithium-ion batteries and electrodes for electric arc furnaces (EAF), used in the production of steel.4
Lithium: Lithium hydroxide, lithium metal foil, lithium ferrophosphate, lithium hexafluorophosphate
and lithium ferro manganese phosphate are critical materials. Spodumene ores and concentrates are
not.
Nickel and cobalt concentrates: Nickel and cobalt concentrates are not critical, but their metals and
sulphates are.
Nickel, cobalt and manganese: We need to convert these at least into NCM PCAM (nickel-cobalt-
manganese and Precursor to Cathode Active Materials), to increase the metal grade, as the metal
salts of nickel and cobalt typically only contain 22-23% of the metal of interest.
Platinum group metals (PGM): PGM include six transition metals: platinum, palladium, rhodium,
ruthenium, osmium, and iridium. These metals are highly valued for their high melting points,
resistance to corrosion and wear, and excellent catalytic properties, making them invaluable to many
industries. Hydrogen producing proton exchange membrane (PEM) electrolysers and PEM fuel cells
rely on platinum group metal catalysts, notably platinum and iridium.
Australia does have some PGM resources, mainly explored in Western Australia and Tasmania, but
these are significantly smaller in comparison to the global reserves, which are primarily located in
South Africa and Russia. South Africa is the world's largest producer and holder of PGMs, notably
platinum, and accounts for approximately 75%-80% of the world's platinum production (190 tonnes)
and around 95% of the world's reserves. Russia, on the other hand, is the largest producer of
palladium, accounting for nearly half of global supply.
For PEM electrolysers, the key metal is iridium, of which 7 to 8 tonnes are mined every year, mainly as
a minor by-product of platinum mining, and up to 95% of annual iridium extraction occurs in southern
Africa. PEM electrolysers use iridium at the anode and platinum at the cathode, which are typically
printed as catalyst-containing ‘inks’ in a thin layer applied to the proton-exchange membrane. This
forms a catalyst coated membrane (CCM), which splits water into oxygen and hydrogen under an
electric current.5
Currently, Australia does minimal iridium and platinum production, and no concentrates. Companies
in this space are Chalice Mining, Podium Minerals and Future Metals, with some exploration activity
by Australian Vanadium and Neometals.
Rare earths: Neodymium, Praseodymium, Dysprosium, Samarium and Terbium are the key critical
metals of interest (for magnets). Cerium and Lanthanum are ubiquitous and have little value.
Silicon: Sand is not a critical mineral, but solar PV and microchip grade elemental silicon is.

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Copper—The Pathway to Net Zero. The Interna,onal Copper Associa,on. 06 March 2023.
hKps://copperalliance.org/resource/copper-pathway-to-net-zero/
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Graphite Supply chain challenges & recommenda,ons for a cri,cal mineral. The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies.
Amrish Ritoe, Irina Patrahau, Michel Rademaker. March 2022. hKps://hcss.nl/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/Graphite-
Challenges-and-Recommenda,ons-HCSS-2022.pdf
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Pla,num group metals: an enabler for hydrogen, not a barrier. HydrogenTechWorld. January 5, 2023.
Margery Ryan, Principal Strategy Analyst for PGM, Johnson MaKhey2023 hKps://hydrogentechworld.com/pla,num-group-metals-an-enabler-for-hydrogen-not-a-barrier
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Zircon, ilmenite and rutile: Mineral sands aren’t critical, but refined titanium dioxide, zirconium
dioxide and titanium and zirconium metals are.

Once again, thank you for the opportunity to provide input into this important discussion. As the home of the 120-year-old Western Australian School of Mines and the new Resources Technology and Critical
Minerals Trailblazer, Curtin University is keen to remain involved in any further discussion of critical minerals and their importance to our nation.

Yours sincerely

Professor Melinda Fitzgerald
Deputy Vice-Chancellor, Research

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